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Introduction
Being from Las Vegas, Nevada, I enjoy a wide variety of unique activities
and opportunities. The obvious and most famous of these are driving down Las
Vegas Boulevard and looking at the neon world that is my home, losing money in
casinos searching for riches that are never promised, and the occasional run-in with
Elvis Presley. In addition to the exciting entertainment that exists within Sin City,
I also enjoy something that one probably would not think of when imagining this
desert city: a variety of local, healthy news outlets.
In Southern Nevada, three newspapers are headquartered in Las Vegas. We
have the center-left Las Vegas Sun, the center-right Las Vegas Review Journal, and
the non-partisan, but often credited with being left-leaning, The Nevada
Independent. All these newspapers provide news coverage on issues that range
from county-specific events to occurrences on the national and international stage.
This may not seem like a significant fact, and many would probably expect many
different sources of information, yet that is not the case in many places.
In many places around the country, there is little to no local news coverage.
In the 1900s, local newspapers were among the most vital sources of information,
and local news outlets provided citizens in their areas with the lowdown of weather,
current events, and political information. As time went on, however, local news has
dwindled to historic lows.
Simultaneously, the political tension in the United States has steadily
increased to historic highs not seen since the Civil War. The tension can be felt on
the street and on social media, leading to divisions among the public. The recent
2020 protests around the topic of police brutality and the extreme discourse around
th

the results of the 2020 presidential election that led to the January 6 insurrection
at the United States Capitol Building are just two instances where the ideological
schism in our country can be observed.
In addition to the public's perception of division, we have also seen
increased polarization with political elites. The partisanship in Washington D.C.
has increased steadily from the middle of the 20th century to a point where
bipartisanship is nearly impossible. Ideological camps in both the Democratic and
Republican parties have begun waging cultural and philosophic war. This has led
to a decrease in efficient governing and a loss of trust in the political system by
many Americans.

In this article, I will analyze the interaction that local news and polarization
have on one another. I argue that the country's discourse has profound implications
on politics, and the most popular way that discourse reaches the public affects
political views. I will argue that as local news declines, polarization will increase.
In the following sections, I will discuss some of the root causes of polarization and
the decline of local news. I will then conduct a data analysis to determine if these
phenomena are related to one another.
Polarization
Issues that come onto the radar for lawmakers in the U.S. are captured by
the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, where policy preferences are
created and peddled. Problems arise when both the constituents and the lawmakers
themselves create opinions and form proposals along strict party lines. This has
occurred in the American political system, leading to high political polarization that
is collapsing the ideological center.
Political polarization constitutes a threat to the health of the political system.
It forces voters and legislators to align themselves together in opposition to
legislation across all issues and severely diminishes the likelihood of bipartisan
compromises being made. This, in turn, crystallizes interests into opposing factions
(Baldassarri, Gelman 2008), further compounding the issue of gridlock that is
inherent in democratic institutions such as those built into the framework of the
Constitution. Polarization in the U.S. is characterized by adherence to radical
ideology at both ends of the political spectrum.
Ideological Sorting
Americans have never agreed on political matters, and as far back as the
nation's founding, these disagreements have been hashed out in ideological battles.
As our political system reached maturity, the two-party system became dominant
and allowed individuals to understand how elected officials and candidates would
make decisions partially. Differing from today, the two parties were much more
like one another for a long time, with both including liberal and conservative
outlooks on policy preferences. In the 1960s, Clinton Rossiter, a political scientist,
and historian claimed that "[T]here is and can be no real difference between the
Democrats and the Republicans, because the unwritten laws of American politics
demand that the parties overlap substantially in principle, policy, character, appeal,
and purpose—or cease to be parties with any hope of winning a national election,"
(Fiorina 2016).

This began to change as parties started forming policy attitudes that directly
countered one another. The Democratic Party grew into the party of liberalism and
the Republican Party into the party of conservatism. From the last few decades in
the twentieth century to today, the political parties have become better sorted on
moral and cultural issues (Fiorina, Abrams 2008). Voters have since seen these
parties as vectors of political change that can stand on one side or the other of their
views, effectively solidifying them in their support of their chosen side. This has
been called ideological sorting and occurs when voters move to parties that share
similar outlooks, making them more entrenched in their preferences and less likely
to deviate from adherence to their party.
This sorting of parties has had many effects. We have seen the distance
between parties and their ideology, but also less difference within them
(Hetherington 2009). This has led to the prevalence of party-line votes, where a
majority of one party opposes a majority from the other, in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Since the 1970s, there has been a 30% increase in
the party unity score, and in 2015 was sitting at 90% (Dancey, Sheagley 2017). This
demonstrates how ideological sorting has polarized the parties' elites, leading to the
next major driver of polarization.
Negative Partisanship & Top-Down Polarization
As mentioned above, the parties have become more ideologically
homogenous. This has led elites within the parties to move to more extreme
ideological poles. There were points where both the Republicans and Democrats
had overlapping preferences, but today there is little to no preference overlap
between them (Banda, Cluverius 2018). This can be seen with the increased
prominence of strict party-line voting, which has increased in recent decades.
The polarization of the elites is partly due to the negative partisanship that
has become a norm in governance. Negative partisanship occurs when political
preferences are formed not in favor of a particular political group or policy outlook
but in opposition to another group. Today, larger swaths of Republicans and
Democrats hold strongly negative views of the opposing party than in the past
(Abramowits, Webster 2015). These negative views make their way into the
legislative process, and we have seen an increase in strict party-line voting that
highlights how negative partisanship can affect bipartisan legislating.

Due to the increased polarization among political elites, the American
electorate has also become more polarized. This is a top-down process, where the
polarization occurs strongest among the high-ranking politicians who receive mass
media attention nationwide. Today, partisan media sources allow citizens to match
their news consumption to fit their ideological preferences (Levendusky 2013).
Partisan media amplifies the messages disseminated from both political poles and
puts the opinions and actions of political elites on display. With the focus on hyperpolarized elites, Americans are flooded with arguments from the polarized political
elite.
Because these politicians appear on the air at no extra cost, they have
effectively become part of the journalistic machine used to draw in audiences and
act as sources for information (Ben-Porath 2007). Elite polarization amplifies
partisan-motivated reasoning (Robinson, Mullinix 2016), which explains why even
in everyday life, the effects of political polarization can be felt.
The Decline of Local News
Local news has long been the medium of information that connected people
with their neighbors and important events in their areas. In addition to providing
information about developments in their communities, local news plays a vital role
in driving civic engagement and allowing citizens to hold their elected officials
accountable (Martin, McCrain 2019). According to Penelope Abernathy and the
UNC's Center for Innovation and Sustainability in Local Media, between 2004 and
2014, 664 of the 8,591 local newspapers had vanished (2016). With the prominence
of local news at its lowest levels in U.S. history, this has had implications for the
knowledge citizens have surrounding politics, shaping their ideological and
engagement in the political world.
The Internet's Role
The prominence of the internet has led to a decline in the news and
journalism industry. As more readers migrated from traditional means of news
consumption toward new online news outlets, advertisers and investors moved
away from these seemingly antiquated forms of dissemination. The migration to
online outlets has led to a decline in one of the main sources of income for
newspapers: ad revenue. Between 2008 and 2018, there was a 68% drop in ad
revenue across the newspaper industry (Hendrickson 2019).

The preference for online news sources is partly due to the ease with which
the general public can access the internet at home and on the go. According to Pew
Research's Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, as of 2019, 90% of adults in the United
States use the internet, with 73% of them having broadband internet services in
their homes (2019). Because many of the news sources on the internet are free of
cost, consumers become accustomed to using the internet to obtain information
without a subscription price (Payne 2011). The increased access to the internet,
coupled with free access to information, has allowed online-based news outlets to
thrive. In contrast, local news outlets that have typically been the medium of choice
have declined severely.
Media Concentration
In the United States, media ownership has slowly been amassed by a small
number of corporations. From 1984 to 2005, the mass media industry held by the
top 10 media firms went from 17.7% to 35.5% (Vizcarrondo 2013). The 2000s was
a period where local news outlets struggled to gain a footing in the changing
environment. Many of these outlets were purchased by investment groups, and
today, seven of the largest 25 newspaper owners are investment groups (Abernathy
2016). As large media conglomerates take over smaller news outlets, we see two
main patterns emerge.
First, the news shown has less to do with the occurrences in the local area
and more to do with national news. This problem has implications for many aspects
of daily life, but it has specific effects on political knowledge. Most of the
information put forward to the public about political candidates comes from local
print newspapers (Hayes, Lawless 2018). When this medium is focused on
increasingly national news due to media conglomerations dictating the topics, local
populations receive less information about politics in their area.
Second, with large takeovers by corporations, the news that acquired outlets
report becomes partisan. One such example comes by analyzing the stations
acquired by the Sinclair Broadcast Group that owns over 290 stations. As Sinclair
has bought these outlets, there has been a rightward partisan shift in content that
can be expected to have consequences for election outcomes and polarization
(Martin, McCrain 2019). This ideological shift in news coverage reflects the
political views of Sinclair, which can alter the narratives presented in the media.
The decline in local media due to media concentration has led the news in
circulation to be partisan, making it less effective at informing the public.

Methods
Hypothesis.
With the current trends of increased polarization and the decline of local
news, it appears that they are linked in some way. I hypothesize that as local news
declines, polarization increases.
Methods Overview
In order to complete this study, Pew Research Center's Newspaper Fact
Sheet (July 9, 2019) was utilized. Pew compiled data on the state of newspapers in
the United States from 1940 to 2018 that includes: unique visitors of newspaper
websites, visit duration of newspaper websites, estimated advertising, circulation
revenue of the newspaper industry, the share of newspaper advertising revenue
coming from digital advertising, employment in newspaper newsrooms and total
estimated circulation of U.S. daily newspapers. For this research, the total estimated
circulation of U.S. newspapers was used as a proxy for the prevalence of local news
organizations over time. Pew collected this information from the News Media
Alliance (NMA), a trade association representing newspapers in the United States
and Canada. NWA represents large daily newspapers as well as hyperlocal news
sources (News Media Alliance). Their calculations of estimated circulation include
print and digital, including both weekly newspapers and Sunday-specific
newspapers. The data I used in this research includes the number of weekly and
Sunday newspapers in circulation from 1951 to 2017. In the data, the number of
weekly newspapers in circulation is coded as (weekly_million) and the and Sunday
papers as (sunday_million), which are the independent variables. These millions of
newspapers are used to measure both variables.
Throughout the 66 years observed, the data shows a decline in the number
of newspapers in circulation. This begins at the end of the 1980s and continues to
decline further as time goes on. The most weekly newspapers in circulation of any
year were in 1973, when 63.15 million were circulated. The year with the least
number of weekly newspapers in circulation was in 2017, when 30.95 million were
circulated. The average number of weekly newspapers in circulation during the
elapsed time was 56.20 million.
A similar trend is occurring for the Sunday newspapers, but the decline
begins in the early 1990s. The most Sunday newspapers in circulation were in the
year 1993, when 62.57 million were in circulation. The year with the least amount
of Sunday papers was in 2017 with 33.97 million in circulation. The average
number of observed Sunday newspapers in circulation is 52.10 million.

Graph 1. Newspaper circulation over time.

To measure polarization, I used Voteview's NOMINATE scores were used.
Voteview is a project that was created in the late 1980s and early 1990s by political
scientists Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal at Carnegie-Mellon University to
follow every congressional roll call vote in American History (Voteview). The
project tracks votes in both the House of Representatives and the Senate through
time, analyzes them, and assigns each congress a polarization score.
Graph 2. Polarization score over time

Data from the 82nd Congress of 1951 to the 115th Congress of 2017
illustrates polarization in the United States. The closer the score is to 1, the more
polarized the congress is, and the closer to –1 the number is, the closer the congress
is to being void of polarization completely. These scores are given to each congress
that was measured, and it follows that these scores were given every two years at
the conclusion of the congress.
Although data for both the House and Senate were available, the House was
chosen as the House is made up of more members, reflecting more accurately the
preferences of the American people. In my data, the polarization score is coded as
(polar_score) and is the dependent variable.
During 1951 - 2017, there is an increase in polarization in the House of
Representatives. The House was least polarized during the 83rd Congress of 1953
with a polarization score of .53. It was most polarized during the most recent 115th
Congress of 2017, with a polarization score of .88. The average polarization score
over the measured period is .67.
In addition to the polarization score, I inputted the President's political party
for each year that has a score. This was done to see if the President's political
affiliation affected the polarization score of the congresses. This is a binary control
variable that I have added, and it is coded as (party). A Democratic President is
represented as a 1, and a Republican President is represented as a 0.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name

Observatio Mean
ns

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Weekly Newspapers in
Circulation (IV)

34

56.20

7.83

30.95

63.15

Sunday Newspapers in
Circulation (IV)

34

52.10

6.90

33.97

62.60

34

0.67

0.12

0.53

0.88

34

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Polarization Score (DV)
Party of the President
(Control)

Results
To test my hypothesis, I ran two linear regressions; one for the effect that
weekly newspapers have on polarization scores and one for the effect that Sunday
newspapers have on polarization. I included the President's political party in office
during each congress that was measured in both models.
Table 2.

Polariz

Score

ation
Weekly

-0.011***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.023)
1.309***
(0.111)

Party
Constant

Observat

34

ions
All models estimated using regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.

Polariz

Score

ation
Sunday
Party
Constant

Observat

0.000
(0.003)
0.035
(0.043)
0.634
(0.167)

34

ions
All models estimated using regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

The circulation of weekly newspapers is very statically impactful. The
effect of weekly newspapers on the polarization score is negative, meaning as the
number of weekly newspapers in circulation decreases, the polarization score
increases. The effect of weekly newspaper circulation is significant at the 0.05
level. As the number of weekly newspapers in circulation declines by 1 million,
there is a 0.011 increase in the polarization score.
When I tested the effect of the circulation of Sunday newspapers, there was
a much less impactful outcome. The circulation of Sunday newspapers was
positive, meaning that as the number of Sunday newspapers decreases, there is a
decrease in the polarization score. However, this figure is insignificant as it has a P
value of 0.911, placing it out of the 0.05 significance level.
The difference in the effects of the weekly and Sunday newspapers in
circulation makes sense and was expected. The number of weekly newspapers in
circulation has remained much higher than that of the Sunday papers, showing that
they have been less prominent. It follows that it has less of an impact on
polarization.
The political party of the President in office during the congresses that were
measured was included as a control variable in the regression in Table 1 for weekly
newspaper circulation as well as in the regression in Table 2 for Sunday newspaper
circulation. In both regressions, the political party of the President had no statistical
significance. For weekly newspapers, the control had a P value of 0.979, making it
statistically insignificant at the 0.05 level. When ran with the Sunday newspapers,
the P-value of the control was 0.420, again deeming it statistically insignificant at
the 0.05 level.
My analysis of the regressions supports my hypothesis; as local media
declines, polarization increases. This can be seen with the data provided in Table 1
and discussed earlier. As the number of weekly newspapers in circulation decreases,
polarization increases.
Sunday newspapers have no statistical significance, as mentioned above,
but they are not the most common method of newspaper distribution and therefore
have more negligible effect on the polarization score. Because the control variable
was insignificant in both regressions, it shows that it does not matter which party is
in power at the executive level. Polarization increased during both Republican and
Democrat-led governments.
Conclusion
In this article, I aimed to analyze how the decline of local news affected
polarization in the United States. The results of the statistical analysis provide
evidence in favor of my hypothesis that as the decline of local news increased, so
has polarization.

In the U.S., there has been a significant decline in the number of newspapers
in circulation, a proxy that I used to estimate the health of local news outlets. The
data collected from Pew Research showcased how the circulation of both weekly
and Sunday newspapers has been in decline for several decades. Simultaneously,
the Voteview's polarization score used to measure the change in polarization among
Congress over time also increased. At first glance, it looked as if these two were
correlated. My analysis of the data later confirmed this.
The decline of local news had a casual effect on the polarization scores that
were given. I added in the control variable of the President's political party during
each Congress that was given a polarization score to see if there was any connection
between which party held control over the federal government and the amount of
polarization. There was no connection, showing that it was irrelevant which party
held power.
This research is important because it is imperative to look at the relationship
between our media systems and our political system. Today there is a high level of
polarization that does not seem to be going anywhere, and the decline of local news
is a crucial factor in further polarization. If the United States wants to combat this
issue, an in-depth understanding of how our information distribution system works
must be attained. This article is only a portion of the overall research that needs to
be conducted to achieve that goal.
My research is limited in a couple of ways. There are more variables that I
believe contribute to the polarization of the congress that should be analyzed. My
control variable was needed to observe how control over the executive branch
affects polarization. However, the government is more intricately connected, and it
may be helpful to collect and analyze data on which party held the majority in each
of the congresses measured. In addition, although the data used to represent the
decline of local news was relatively representative, there are better data sets that
could be used to measure the connection. One such dataset is the one included in
the UNC's Center for Innovation & Sustainability in Local Media's The Rise of a
New Media Baron and the Emerging Threat of News Deserts. This dataset might
showcase a more accurate decline of local news. I attempted to attain the metadata
for my research but was unable to gain access to it.
With the continued decline of local news, more research must be done on
how this will affect our democracy in the future. Future research should investigate
how the decline of local news has accelerated in recent years and how to combat
that issue. Also, it is imperative that research examines how polarized democracies
create policy and what effect polarization has on trust in government. As
polarization steadily increases, the country runs many risks, one of which I believe
could be a legitimacy crisis that would further hinder the ability to govern the
population effectively.
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